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Introduction1
Since independence in 1970, governments in 
Fiji have been most often described around two 
major themes. The first emphasises the race and/
or ethnicity of the country’s governments, and 
whether they were led by Taukei or Indo-Fijians 
— prime ministers Ratu Sir Kamasese Mara, 
Timoci Bavadra, Sitiveni Rabuka, Laisenia Qarase, 
Josaia Voreqe (Frank) Bainimarama, or Mahendra 
Chaudhry. Occasionally, class is injected into this 
description, usually in the Weberian form of race 
and class, ethnicity and class. The second theme 
has characterised governments according to 
whether they held power as the result of elections 
or as the consequence of parliamentary takeovers 
and coups.2 When the second means of acquiring 
and holding power has provided the basis of 
authority, governments have been continually 
castigated, urged to ‘return Fiji to democracy’. 
While there have been accounts which do not 
follow these predominant themes, including 
from academics and others located within 
dependency thinking (Ratuva 2013; Sutherland 
1992), their influence has been limited in the 
face of the continuing focus upon the identities 
of race/ethnicity and elections as the basis for 
government legitimacy.
This Discussion Paper argues instead that 
the current government constitutes a particular, 
different and distinct form of class representation. 
While all governments in capitalist societies 
represent both capital and labour, the Bainimarama 
Government does so in a specific manner. During 
the period from 2006 until the 2014 election, the 
main existing forms of political representation were 
overturned and marginalised. The moves against 
previous political parties and other institutions, 
including the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) and 
trade unions, were especially prominent. The 
principal task of the government both before and 
since the election has been how to represent all 
classes and strata when the main earlier forms of 
representation are no longer capable of doing so. 
That is, mediation at the political level has taken on 
a particular hue.
Additionally, and what gives the government 
its most distinct characteristic, it is required 
to mediate on behalf of capital when its most 
important members are not of any particular firms 
or capitalists. That is, the government is required 
to mediate politically within the capitalist class 
without being of capital. In order to strengthen the 
capacity to mediate on behalf of capital, success in 
representing labour, including retaining popularity, 
will be critical. As this Discussion Paper shows, this 
form of mediation at the political level makes the 
recently elected government distinct from previous 
Fiji governments, which tied political power to 
economic power in very obvious ways.
Firstly, this paper explains the particular 
form of mediation that has arisen in Fiji — 
Bonapartism — including by reference to its 
origins in nineteenth-century France. Secondly, the 
representation of capital, especially local capital, in 
previous Fiji governments is outlined, so that the 
differences with the Bainimarama Government can 
be shown and the current distinct form of political 
mediation in the political sphere understood. 
Finally, it is explained how successfully representing 
labour will not only be critical for the maintenance 
of electoral democracy but also in 
strengthening the government’s 
capacity to mediate politically, 
representing capitalism and some 
capitalists over others.
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Governing as Mediation
There remains considerable confusion over whom 
and what the recently elected Bainimarama-led 
government represents. Even before FijiFirst won 
the election, the confusion continued with the 
focus on the two ‘old’ themes noted above. Thus 
the emphasis on the fact that Bainimarama, as a 
Taukei naval officer and head of the Republic of 
Fiji Military Forces, seized power in 2006 from 
a government also led by an indigenous Fijian 
— Qarase. This preoccupation continued after 
Bainimarama resigned from his military post, and 
as head of FijiFirst he campaigned for an end to the 
politics of race and/or ethnicity. The Bainimarama 
Government persisted with this theme after 
taking office,3 which has left commentators still 
floundering as they try to identify whom and 
what it represents in terms of race/ethnicity and 
democracy. In the uncertainty, commentary has 
returned to the earlier fascinations, including 
assessing electoral ‘ethnic loyalties’ (Fraenkel 
2015a) and democratic ‘fragility’ (Lal 2014). There 
has been little progress in understanding the 
current government’s politics.
When FijiFirst comfortably won the September 
2014 election, the ‘return to democracy’ theme 
became persistent. With international and domestic 
observers pronouncing the elections as ‘free and 
fair’, this assessment outweighed objections and 
more cautious evaluations (Madraiwiwi 2015). 
Overall, there is a striking similarity in the current 
response to that which followed the 1999 elections 
won by the Chaudhry-led Peoples Coalition, 
dominated by the Fiji Labour Party (MacWilliam 
2001; cf. Firth 2001:7).
A major reason for the intellectual disarray is 
that while Fiji is readily described as a capitalist 
economy (Lal 2006:3; Norton 1977, 1990:1), 
there has been considerable reluctance to couple 
capitalism with a process of accumulation, and the 
existence of the classes that express this process. 
For most analysts, Fiji is a country where capitalism 
reigns but without capitalists or a class of labour; 
instead, what divisions exist are of races, ethnicities 
and/or communities. Even those who introduce 
class do so in a Weberian manner, thus race and 
class, class and ethnicity are treated as if class is one 
of a number of comparable descriptors rather than, 
as with a Marxist materialist account, the central 
determining condition of all societies beyond the 
most primitive (Marx and Engels 1998:4).
By way of illustration, consider the following. 
Writing soon after independence, Robert Norton 
(1977) employed an admittedly ‘erratic use of the 
terms “race” and “ethnic” ’ while favouring use of 
the latter (Norton 1990:xiii). He concluded:
Cultural, social, and economic differences 
between the major populations of Fiji are 
perhaps greater than in any comparable 
society. Special features of colonial rule and 
the capitalist economy encouraged separation 
and preservation of distinct traditions. 
(Norton 1990:1)
Instead, for this paper, it is useful to emphasise 
the importance of governing as a form of 
mediation, which takes distinct, distinguishable 
forms of the connections between economic 
and political power in capitalist countries. One 
description, provided by Karl Marx, applicable to 
the particular circumstances which have arisen in 
Fiji, was constructed to deal with mid-nineteenth-
century France. There, Louis Bonaparte first came 
to power through an election, but when blocked 
by parliament in 1851, staged a coup. From first 
president of the Second French Republic, he 
became the emperor of the Second French Empire, 
Napoleon III. Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of 
Louis Bonaparte is probably best known for its 
description of the French peasantry as a ‘sack of 
potatoes’, and how this characterisation relates to 
the larger questions of class and, therefore, class 
consciousness (reprinted in Fernbach 1973). For 
Marx, Bonaparte represented the most numerous 
class of French society — the smallholding 
peasants. Again, in the well-known formulation, 
Bonaparte represented the peasants, who were a 
class ‘in itself ’ but not ‘for itself ’. That is, being 
unaware or conscious of itself as a class, the 
peasantry was unorganised and incapable of 
arranging its own representation in the state and 
against the other classes of French society, including 
the ascending bourgeoisie.
However, as well as representing the peasantry, 
the unelected Bonaparte also represented all 
the other classes and strata, ‘great landowners, 
financial bourgeoisie, industrial bourgeoisie, petty 
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bourgeoisie (of various gradations), industrial 
proletariat, (and) lumpenproletariat’ (Fernbach 
1973:11). Bonapartism appeared to be an instance 
where the class ‘struggle seems to have reached 
the compromise that all classes fall on their knees, 
equally mute and impotent, before the rifle butt’ 
(ibid.:15). However, as much as a military coup 
rather than an election was the means by which 
Bonaparte came to power, his subsequent rule 
depended upon his ability to mediate relations 
between these various classes and strata at a 
moment when France was undergoing the 
transition to industrial capitalism. Or, as Michael 
Cowen concluded, summarising the argument 
presented by Joe Foweraker (1982) regarding Brazil, 
‘mediation is not about political intervention in 
the economy but about political intervention in 
the political sphere: this being the case, political 
action, of whatever source, cannot be ascribed from 
and to the economic state of the actors in question’ 
(Cowen 1986:360). That is, whether a government 
comes to power as the result of a military coup or 
an election is not the critical issue here. As in the 
case of nineteenth-century France, and now in 
early twenty-first-century Fiji, the most important 
characteristic of a government — whether headed 
by Bonaparte or Bainimarama — is that its head 
and leading members did not belong to the holders 
of economic power. Put crudely in terms of 
personalities, Fiji’s prime minister is an ex-soldier 
with continuing close ties to his military base, not a 
businessman as were Ratu Mara and Qarase.
Political Representation and Economic 
Power — Representing Capital
From the 1960s until 2006
For each previously elected Fijian government that 
has remained in power for any length of time, there 
have been close connections between the holding 
of economic and political power. The first post-
independence government, headed by Ratu Mara, 
joined the representation of international firms 
and local European commercial concerns, with 
Indo-Fijian and indigenous businesses. The last 
were dominated by chiefly landowning interests, 
for whom maintaining the Taukei dominance 
of the colonial property settlement over land 
was critical financially as well as politically/
ideologically. That is, indigenous, primarily rentier 
capital secured its economic power through highly 
personalised ties of representation to members of 
the class occupying key state institutions, including 
parliament, local government, and the GCC. For 
the most important indigenous commercial figures, 
there was little distance between their political and 
economic positions.
In 1966, prior to independence, the political 
bloc, dominated by Taukei chiefs, with local 
European and other ‘minority’ support, formed 
the appropriately named Alliance Party. A major 
objective of the bloc was to thwart the growing 
commercial aspirations of Indo-Fijian capital, 
which had gained especially important access to 
finance with the 1962 entry of the Gujarat India-
based Bank of Baroda. Electoral, parliamentary 
and administrative politics were dominated until 
1987 by the clash between the Alliance Party and 
the primarily Indo-Fijian National Federation 
Party and the Fiji Labour Party. The last two 
contested representing Indo-Fijian capital, cane 
growers, urban workers and other strata, including 
small traders.
While this clash could appear as a continuing 
one of race and/or ethnic competition for political 
power, beneath the surface two critical changes 
were occurring in the nature of local capital. As 
previously important international trading and 
plantation firms, particularly Australia-based Burns, 
Philp and Carpenters, were withdrawing from the 
country, space was being opened for other local 
bourgeois and would-be bourgeois. While major 
Indo-Fijian firms began to invest overseas, and 
the older Taukei chiefs made limited commercial 
advance, a new generation of indigenous 
businessmen and women sought political power to 
further their ambitions. As much as these aspirant 
commercial figures moved into new fields of 
accumulation, they worked to maintain the direct 
ties between political and economic power used by 
their predecessors.
By 1987, the military coup headed by Lieutenant 
Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka, which overthrew the 
government formed after the electoral victory 
of the Fiji Labour Party and its recent ally the 
National Federation Party, provided the opportunity 
for major changes in the process of indigenous 
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accumulation. First appearing garbed in a racial/
ethnic form in the name of indigenous fears and 
hopes, the takeover was subsequently changed into 
party representation (Ratuva 2013). The Soqosoqo 
ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT) and then the 
Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) were 
organised to provide the means for parliamentary 
and government control.
From 1987 until the 2006 deposition of the 
Laisenia Qarase government by another military 
coup, the links between political power and 
economic power so important to the changes were 
clearly visible (Ratuva 2013). Indigenous capitalists 
who accumulated primarily through plundering 
state assets and prising open ownership of activities 
constructed by international and other local firms 
became the pre-eminent local capitalists, with their 
members prominent in parliament, government, 
and many administration positions. Political power 
was coupled with state power to extend economic 
power. The hold over key financial institutions, 
including the National Bank of Fiji and the Fiji 
Development Bank, was used to fuel indigenous 
accumulation, including by Rotumans (Grynberg 
et al. 2002).
The most obvious and important initial 
commercial form Taukei ambitions took during the 
period from the early 1980s until the mid-2000s 
was Fijian Holdings Limited (FHL). Established to 
extend the operations of the provincial councils, 
FHL was at first solely owned through equity 
subscriptions from these bodies, the Native Lands 
Trust Board (NLTB), and the Fijian Affairs Board 
(FAB). After the 1987 military coup, the Rabuka-
led government advanced a Fiji $20 million 
loan ostensibly to provide finance and boost the 
position of the councils, where chiefs and their 
allies held power.
However, over the following years, the firm 
was effectively privatised. Shares were split into 
two categories — those held by councils, the 
NLTB, and the FAB (B-class shares); and a second, 
distinct type of share, owned by private equity 
firms associated with Taukei individuals and 
families (A-class shares). The former category’s 
shareholders became non-voting, recipients of 
dividends only, and in some years received a lower 
rate than A-class shares. The private equity firm 
shares not only became the majority holdings, they 
also formed the basis of voting rights in FHL.
Significantly, the private share ownership was 
often funded by loans, particularly from the Fiji 
Development Bank. One bank official, Laisenia 
Qarase, became the most important figure in 
several of the firms that acquired substantial equity 
and voting rights in FHL. He was also a financial 
adviser to the FAB and an adviser to the GCC. 
FHL became one of Fiji’s largest firms through a 
combination of takeovers of existing operations, 
joint ventures especially with international firms, 
and obtaining government contracts.
In 2000, the government, headed by interim 
prime minister Qarase, was installed with military 
support after the overthrow of the elected 
Chaudhry-led Peoples Coalition government. 
The Qarase government changed the interest-free 
loan into a grant. While the change improved the 
equity stake of the provincial councils, the FAB, 
and the NLTB, it did not change the distinction 
between voting (A class) and non-voting (B class) 
shares. FHL became an even more powerful arm 
of what was now a very prominent ‘buccaneering 
bourgeoisie’ (Marx and Engels 1998), among whose 
members were people who tied their economic 
power directly to political positions at the apex of 
state power.
Military rule and breaking ties
Upon coming to power in 2006, the military regime 
broke the direct ties between the economic and 
political power of the Taukei business interests 
that had relied so heavily on the political power 
exercised by the Rabuka and Qarase governments. 
This was done in part by overthrowing the 
Qarase-led government and moving against many 
of its appointees who held public office. Most 
importantly for its political strength, military 
officers, including Bainimarama, also held many of 
the most important positions in the administration. 
The Bainimarama Government also drove changes 
in commercial firms’ managements, including FHL. 
Qarase’s closest commercial ally, board secretary 
and CEO Sitiveni Weleilakeba, was removed from 
that firm. The new regime’s favourites, including 
military personnel, were installed on the FHL 
board, and the firm subsequently set on a different 
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managerial and commercial path. During the 
military regime, the ties between FHL and Indo-
Fijian capital were strengthened, including through 
a majority shareholding of a prominent trading 
firm, RB Patel. FHL now has operations in other 
countries, including Papua New Guinea.
Before the 2014 election, in a move that 
emphasised its distance from any particular 
firm, the regime changed the terms of the Fiji 
$20 million grant to FHL back into a loan, with 
specific commercial criteria designed to accelerate 
repayment to the government. Dividends to both 
classes of shares were equalised, increasing the rate 
at which the government’s loan for B-class shares 
could be repaid.
Significantly for this account, and the forms 
that industrialisation of agriculture might later take 
under the Bainimarama Government, the flagship 
Taukei firm has consistently avoided investing 
in agriculture, although this may be about to 
change (Panapasa 11/7/2015). In this way, Taukei 
commerce avoided a clash with the predominant 
Taukei smallholders in the countryside over the 
forms production in agriculture took.
The connections between economic power and 
political power, so important in the initial post-
independence governments when landowning, rent-
collecting chiefs were present in most governing 
institutions, were also broken by important changes 
in the military. Senior officers in the military were 
increasingly career soldiers, with reduced ties 
to the higher echelons of the landed aristocracy. 
This began to be obvious in the 1980s when the 
‘commoner’ Rabuka rose to the top of the military 
and then became prime minister (Sharpham 
2000:80–81). Rabuka subsequently used his 
political position to become a minor businessman, 
emphasising how personal accumulation followed 
and did not precede the gaining of state power for 
these indigenous buccaneering capitalists.
Between 2006 and 2014 the military regime 
was headed by officers who largely did not hold 
substantial economic power and who were 
increasingly distant as a professionalised stratum 
from the chiefs who initially dominated the 
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (cf. Baledrokadroka 
2015). While the latter’s position in the senior 
ranks of the military forces, in other state 
positions, the legislature, the administration, and 
other representative organs including the GCC, 
previously joined political with economic power, 
since 2006 there has been a major change. (Whether 
this change will be permanent is another matter 
altogether.) The military regime attacked and 
marginalised the political institutions which were 
critical for the ‘old regime’ (the GCC, the SVT/
SDL/Social Democratic Liberal Party lineage, and 
those constructed under the 1997 constitution) 
as well as the party and trade union structures of 
organised labour. At the 2014 election, no less than 
10 former military officers won seats, and nearly 
all of these were subsequently appointed ministers 
in the FijiFirst government. This break between 
economic and political power, epitomised by Taukei 
ex-military officers with few substantial commercial 
interests of their own, became critical for the form 
of mediation represented by the Bainimarama 
Government.
Indo-Fijian capital
With the 1999 election defeat of the National 
Federation Party and its near disappearance from 
representative politics, Indo-Fijian capital’s political 
marginalisation, which had begun with the 1987 
coup, was extended. The moves to invest overseas 
that had started in the 1980s and subsequently 
accelerated were indicative of the further loss of 
political power. Instead of having an organised form 
of representation, such as a party that could share 
in the spoils of government, particular Indo-Fijian 
businesses had to take whatever benefits they could 
get out of the Qarase-led governments that, first and 
foremost, represented the Taukei buccaneers. Some 
also sheltered under the Fiji Labour Party, which 
retained a degree of authority until it imploded 
after 2006. That is, Indo-Fijian capital — the most 
commercially successful and prominent local capital 
across many areas of the national economy — could 
not organise itself in a party or other cohesive 
form. The massive financial and other support 
FijiFirst received from firms and individual business 
people for its election campaign emphasised the 
extent to which the party, led by non-commercial 
figures, had come to represent the Indo-Fijian 
bourgeoisie, financial and industrial as well as other 
business strata.4
SSGM Discussion Paper 2012/1  http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm6                                                                                                                           State, Society & Govern ce in Melanesia
Scott MacWilliam
That the most important regime figures in the 
government do not have substantial commercial 
operations of their own, regardless of the 
allegations of individual corruption, makes it easier 
to mediate between the competing capitalists. 
Once again, a major characteristic of Bonapartism 
appears when considering the Bainimarama 
regime’s capacity to take political action that 
‘cannot be ascribed from and to the economic state 
of the actors in question’ (Cowen 1986:360).
Representing Labour in Capitalism
An early attempt to describe the policies of FijiFirst 
suggested that its election campaigning proposals 
were populist. This direction, Brij Lal (2014) 
claimed, gave FijiFirst greater support over the 
Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA) in 
urban and peri-urban areas. He cites the campaign 
promises of increased electricity subsidies for 
poorer families, as well as price control of some 
foods, free medication, and other intended 
policies as instances deserving this description. 
Unfortunately, Lal does not explain why these 
deserve to be labelled populist and not simply 
popular, directed at winning votes within the 
recently reconstructed and widely demanded 
electoral form of capitalist democracy. Instead, 
here, it is proposed that the government’s 
popularity was not simply important for 
winning the majority of seats at the election — a 
characteristic of elections everywhere. Popularity 
is also important for the government’s capacity 
to mediate among the local capitalist class and 
its commercial allies, and could well determine 
whether elections are held in the future or the 
country’s political economy takes on an even more 
authoritarian militarised character once again.
The description populist has been undergoing 
a considerable revival. Having been condemned 
previously as ‘stretched beyond all meaning’ and 
therefore deserving of ‘being retired — or at least 
temporarily suspended — from the vocabulary of 
politics altogether’ (Wood 1982:69), populism and 
populist are now frequently attached to disparate 
parties, personnel, and policy proposals. Far from 
disappearing from common usage, populism 
is popular once more, including for describing 
campaigning in Fiji, as noted above. It is also 
commonplace to hear politicians and others warn 
against populism and, specifically, ‘dangerous 
populist excesses’ (D’Eramo 2013). How applicable 
or useful, then, is the term populism to explain 
either the election campaigning or the subsequent 
post-election policies of the Bainimarama 
Government?
Modern populism, it should be recalled, has 
its origins in the advance of industrial capitalism 
in Europe, initially in the changes to agriculture. 
One tradition has at its centre the paradox that 
centralised control of the macroeconomy through 
the state is required to secure the long-term 
survival of decentralised ‘small scale units of 
production and consumption’ (Cowen 1984:72). As 
Gavin Kitching notes, such objectives as ‘small and 
beautiful’ require for their persistence in the face 
of competition ‘the big and bureaucratic’ (Kitching 
1980:130, 1982). The second tradition has two 
dimensions: populism as ‘part of state practise and 
policy under some conditions’, and ‘under others 
it remains as an oppositional current to the state, 
whether capitalist or not’ (Cowen 1984:72).
There is nothing in the pre-election appeals 
or subsequent policies of FijiFirst and the elected 
government that fits the description populist, anti-
capitalist, or anti-statist. Instead, as noted above, 
in its effort to win the majority of votes at the 2014 
election, Bainimarama and FijiFirst necessarily 
had to be popular. With the military a key state 
apparatus critical for the government’s power, 
anti-statist rhetoric or practice is even less likely. 
Indeed, it is hard to see how any party aiming 
to win government in Fiji’s political economy 
could be either, especially when holding elections 
had become the primary objective for a ‘return 
to (capitalist) democracy’. Instead, the proposed 
policies are clearly explicable as satisfying popular 
demands from voters.
Further, such policies can be most easily 
understood, along with the drive to improve 
education at all levels (see below), as government 
efforts to raise the capacity of the population to 
labour. That is, FijiFirst and the Bainimarama 
Government aimed and continue to aim to 
represent labour in capitalist accumulation. 
Advancing accumulation means representing 
the particular forms in which this occurs (urban 
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manufacturing, rural industries, finance, trading 
etc.), as well as the particular capitalists who own 
and organise firms operating in each arena. As the 
Asian Development Bank report notes, since 2010:
Growth was broad based, with investments 
in finance, construction, and transport 
leading the trend … Fiji’s macroeconomic 
policies continue to support growth … 
With the exception of fishing and mining, 
all productive sectors of the economy are 
estimated to have grown in 2014. (ADB 
2015:249–50)
It was over the representation of labour in 
Fiji’s capitalist economy that the election campaign 
brought the parties together and ensured greatest 
prominence in their appeals to voters. The needs 
of capital for a healthy, skilled, and compliant 
labour force coincided with the needs of each 
party to be popular vote-winning entities. When 
the members of the capitalist class and their 
allies do not comprise a sufficient proportion 
of the voting population upon whom to base 
electoral success, popular support is essential. 
Elections with extended suffrage, in this case 
to all Fijians over 18 years of age, require that 
parties hoping to form government appeal to the 
mass of the population. The bulk of the electorate 
comprises those who labour in various forms, 
wage workers, smallholders, and so on, as well 
as the underemployed and unemployed who 
seek employment in order to meet household 
consumption needs. Elections also provide a 
particular opportunity for the needs of capital, 
including for a skilled labour force, to be joined 
in a popular crusade with the needs of those 
who labour.
As Jon Fraenkel (2015a:45) has detailed:
Bainimarama courted support in 
rural Cakaudrove through a series of 
infrastructure projects, such as completion 
of a 10-kilometre tar-sealed stretch of the 
Buca Bay Road, a nursing station, classroom 
extensions and a hydroelectric power station 
at Somosomo.
The government and FijiFirst were not the 
only campaigners attempting to gain support by 
appealing to voters. During the campaign, most 
parties made general commitments to reduce 
poverty, with measures that included improving 
access to improved schools and medical facilities. 
This direction, of continued concern for education 
and health, was even more important because 
the continued, possibly accelerated movement of 
smallholders off the land increased impoverishment 
and enlarged the relative surplus population or 
industrial reserve army (Marx 1976:ch. 25).
Capital and Poverty Reduction
While estimates vary, there is little doubt that Fiji is 
typical globally in having a large proportion of the 
population impoverished, in both urban and rural 
areas. Further, while poverty is especially associated 
with unemployment and underemployment, 
continuing attacks on the wages of employed 
workers have increased the numbers of working 
poor, also along international lines (Narsey 2006, 
2008, 2012). One long-term critic of successive 
government policies on poverty in the country, 
Father Kevin Barr, stated in late 2012, ‘two thirds 
of Fiji’s population lived in poverty or close to it’ 
(Sharma 12/11/2012). Barr also concluded that ‘60 
per cent of the workers in full-time employment 
earned wages below the poverty line and 15–20 
per cent of the people lived in squatter settlements’ 
(ibid.). What debate does exist about poverty in 
Fiji is conducted largely around the causes and 
their duration, and what measures a government 
can take to alleviate as well as reduce the extent of 
impoverishment. One frequently advocated measure 
is to increase accessibility and raise the standard 
of education.
However, increasing the education of the 
population by raising skills will only advance 
productivity and the general process of 
accumulation if the better-trained labour force is 
engaged in production, joined with other means 
of production in agriculture and manufacturing, 
including the so-called services. Unemployed 
mechanics, technicians, and engineers are not 
only subject to impoverishment, they may also 
threaten law and order. Most importantly of all in 
a capitalist political economy, they do nothing for 
accumulation. Given high rates of unemployment, 
a trend that began in Fiji in the 1980s, whatever 
its subsequent variations as an effect of political 
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crises, a major task of the current government is 
to coordinate and supervise the process by which 
the unemployed and underemployed are attached 
or reattached to land, machinery, office equipment 
and so forth to become productive (Cowen and 
Shenton 1996).
Urbanisation, Land and Agriculture
One side of the government’s difficulties regarding 
employment, impoverishment and economic 
growth arises because of what has occurred 
in the countryside. As Narsey notes (2012:4): 
‘Rural development is probably the biggest and 
most intractable challenge facing Fiji’. There 
has been a continuing movement of population 
from rural to urban areas over more than five 
decades, so that anywhere between 30 and 50 per 
cent of the country’s total population lives in the 
conurbation around Nausori-Suva-Lami in the 
south-east of Viti Levu. Eighty per cent of voters 
at the 2014 election lived on this island. While 
the rate of movement to urban areas has probably 
fluctuated, including during political crises when 
Indo-Fijians, particularly sugarcane farmers, 
left smallholdings, there is an inexorable drift of 
people towards urban and peri-urban life as well as 
commercialised production and consumption on 
rural smallholdings.
This population movement and the 
accompanying stagnation of agriculture in many 
rural areas has been associated with — and has 
even contributed to — the reduced commercial 
and political significance of the once-powerful 
landed aristocracy. Not only has the landed 
aristocracy, long heavily dependent upon rents for 
accumulation and consumption, lost out further 
politically through the recent election (MacWilliam 
forthcoming). Rentier capital, epitomised by 
the Taukei chiefs who feed off monies paid 
by cane farmers, tourist resort operators and 
commercial property lessees, including rents for 
offices occupied by state employees, is under 
sustained attack in Fiji. Prior to the election, 
the interim regime reduced the rents paid to 
chiefs and increased the amounts distributed to 
other indigenous members of the mataqali (the 
landholding unit).
Attacking rentiers, however intellectually 
respectable, is not the same as making agricultural 
land more productive — that problem still remains. 
The recent Fiji 2020 Agriculture Sector Policy 
Agenda produced by the Fiji Ministry of Agriculture 
(2014) with technical assistance from the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
is subtitled ‘Modernizing Agriculture’. The report 
is full of the usual references to improved delivery 
of support services, integration of production, 
processing, marketing and transportation, private–
public partnerships, and innovative business 
arrangements in agribusiness. But it is ambivalent 
on the central question of agricultural production: 
how is labour to be attached to the large areas of 
under- and un-utilised land from which so many 
Fijians have moved or still occupy at low levels 
of productivity? Agribusiness suggests large-
holdings — an industrial form of production 
that has had a limited presence in Fiji and that 
would necessitate turning either the existing rural 
population into wage workers, or encouraging/
forcing some of the urban unemployed back 
into the countryside, also to work for wages in 
forms of industrial production. The alternative, 
to substantially increase the productivity of 
households occupying smallholdings in another 
industrial form, would require a major increase 
in a range of state activities, including agricultural 
extension, processing, marketing — of special 
importance in a country where the rural population 
is spread over many islands — and research. Either 
direction will require the heavy involvement of the 
state machinery and, as such, can be neither anti-
statist nor anti-capitalist/opposed to accumulation 
(see above).
Two moves, one made prior to the election 
and the other subsequently, suggest how the 
government is trying to mediate between these 
forms of agricultural production. For many years, 
there have been objections to the importation of 
a range of food products, most of which are also 
produced in Fiji, but in insufficient quantities and 
qualities to meet local demand, especially from 
tourist hotels. In 2012, Fiji imported approximately 
Fiji $865 million of food items. As the minister for 
agriculture in the interim regime stated:
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The agriculture sector in Fiji is challenged 
by our dependence on imported food, low 
private sector participation, inadequate 
diverse food production and productivity 
and market access for our exports. High food 
price is another issue which has forced some 
families to buy cheaper food, substitutes, 
and has led to a decline in the consumption 
of nutritious food causing malnutrition. 
Therefore, the imports of food from dairy 
products, meat, fruits, vegetables and 
processed food items are increasingly steady 
over the years. (Nasiko 9/9/2013)
In July 2010, the Reserve Bank amalgamated 
two facilities, the Export Finance Facility and 
the Import Substitution Facility, into a single 
entity called the Import Substitution and Export 
Finance Facility (ISEFF). As Investment Fiji (2010), 
the agency established to promote commercial 
activities, stated, the ISEFF would:
… continue to focus on improving Fiji’s 
balance of payments position by assisting 
exporters, large scale commercial agricultural 
farming and renewable energy businesses 
to obtain credit at concessional rates of 
interest … Import Substitution funding 
under ISEFF is available to new and existing 
local agricultural businesses involved in 
import substitution. Businesses may apply 
for concessional funding for the production 
of fruits, vegetables, honey, root crops, 
dairy produce, beef, poultry, pig farming, 
aquaculture and renewable energy. However, 
businesses that produce items in which Fiji is 
already self-sufficient, such as canned meat 
will not be able to access funds under the 
Facility unless the produce is to be exported.
The Reserve Bank advanced funds for the 
facility to the Fiji Development Bank and licensed 
credit institutions at 2 per cent interest, permitting 
these to lend to approved borrowers at up to a 
maximum margin of 6 per cent additional interest. 
In short, the government — through the bank, 
the board of which had undergone major changes 
after the military takeover in 2006 — sought to 
join industrial capital in agriculture with finance 
capital in the name of national self-sufficiency, and 
consumer needs.
Support for private firms became central to 
government policy prior to the election, including 
for those producing dairy products. However, the 
difficulties inherent in this support also became 
obvious. Imported milk prices rose substantially 
and became a source of public grievance during 
the campaign period. Similarly, moves to reduce 
imports of rice illustrate another dimension of the 
political mediations required to increase growth 
and advance accumulation. Rice is grown mainly 
by smallholders, including on irrigation projects 
and by tenant farmer cane growers as a second 
crop. With the departure of many of the latter from 
holdings, rice production was also hit. Attempts to 
expand domestic production, which commenced 
during the inter-war period and received 
intermittent attention subsequently, were revived 
under the interim military regime as the cost of 
rice imports mounted to Fiji $40 million per year. 
The emphasis remained after the election. Visiting 
the Rice Irrigation Sector of Dreketi in Macuata, 
Vanua Levu, six months after the 2014 election, the 
minister for agriculture, another former military 
officer, again stressed the importance of increasing 
the output of rice:
He said that reducing Fiji’s current rice 
import bill would allow more funds to be 
diverted towards developing more rice farms 
in Fiji. The Minister noted … that more work 
need[ed] to be carried out to realise the full 
potential of the rice industry in the North. 
(Sivan 29/3/2015)
While processing of padi — the initial form 
of harvested rice — occurs primarily through 
industrial firms, the importance of smallholders for 
growing the crop has forced the government into 
renewed efforts to provide administration support 
and extension services for growers. These efforts 
occur when, internationally, there is considerable 
tightening of the relationship between supply and 
demand. As the International Grains Council has 
predicted: ‘Global rice reserves are projected to fall 
due to declines in key exporters’ (2014:14).
Sugar production provides another instance of a 
crop dominated by smallholders, where government 
efforts to increase output have been given priority. 
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Expanding Fiji’s sugar output and exports has 
been an important focus of governments since 
independence, with the assistance of preferential 
tariff arrangements from the European Union. A 
specific focus of attention for the Bainimarama 
Government is on farmer training, and again 
on Vanua Levu, where cane farmers have either 
reduced production or stopped growing the crop 
altogether (Vula 6/3/2015).
Whichever forms agricultural increases are 
to take, they pose dilemmas for the government. 
If industrial manufacturing capitals are to 
predominate in large-holding farming, not only 
will this open up numerous fronts for opposition 
from chiefs as well as other mataqali members, 
possibly revitalising party representation against 
the government or even leading to rural revolt, 
SODELPA politicians could be well placed to lead 
whatever forms this dissatisfaction takes. Increasing 
large-holding agriculture would also mean 
adjudicating between the firms that are scrambling 
for farmland, processing factory assistance and 
government support of various forms, including 
tariffs if produce is to be directed at domestic 
markets. Expanded government support for large-
holders and smallholders will not only face the 
by-now entrenched academic and other opposition 
to all forms of ‘government intervention in the 
market’, with ‘import substitution’ a favourite target 
of National Federation Party leader Biman Prasad, 
a former academic economist, but there will also be 
complaints of favouritism and corruption towards 
regions, crops and marketing arrangements.
There isn’t the space here to extend the 
argument through the case of capitals involved 
in urban manufacturing, as important as these 
also would be for increasing employment and 
representing the demands of labour. Similarly, it is 
not possible here to consider productive capitals 
involved in what is described as service industries. 
A longer paper could examine the growth of 
tourism, which, after a short-term decline 
following the 2006 coup, has since expanded again 
(Fiji Bureau of Statistics 2015).5
Election night TV coverage in Fiji revealed at 
least two features of importance for the argument 
presented. Firstly, that the election victory of 
FijiFirst was not only expected by major businesses 
but welcomed, including by Flour Mills of Fiji 
and FHL, whose senior officers appeared as the 
results were being announced. Each of these 
firms is involved in production for domestic as 
well as international markets, so that government 
contracts, tariffs, and international shipping costs 
are central to their operations. Secondly, as a 
corollary of the first, while government is expected 
to improve general conditions for commercial 
operations in and from Fiji, it will be expected to 
mediate between competing concerns, favouring 
some and not others.
One of the directions for Fiji industry projected 
before the election, and which has a long history, 
is to make the country ‘a communications hub’ 
for the region. Given the intensely competitive 
international character of electronics and media 
markets, adjudicating such a direction will be 
extremely difficult. So too will increasing the 
training of the skilled workers who are in short 
supply,6 as well as improving internet access 
throughout Fiji, as noted above.
Many of the recent urban immigrants have 
limited formal education and labour skills required 
for manufacturing or service industry employment. 
In order to promote industrial expansion and 
improved living standards, the Bainimarama 
Government is forced to concentrate on raising 
the capacity for labour. At the same time, the 
government has constructed means to represent 
labour in capitalism through wage discipline, 
including for workers not covered by existing 
agreements and awards.7
The Centrality of Education for the Bainimarama 
Government
While further raising the productivity of labour 
is critical for the reform of capitalism in Fiji, 
reshaping and revitalising education is a central 
component of the drive to increase economic 
growth. Improving schooling is, as the election 
campaign showed, also important for garnering 
popular support among the voting population 
for future elections. As the party of the interim 
administration, FijiFirst was in the strongest 
position to develop its popular appeal across 
the country. A major feature of government 
policies prior to the election had been specific 
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measures undertaken to reduce education costs 
for primary and secondary schooling (ADB 2015: 
249–50). School fees were eliminated, school bus 
fares removed, and other supporting measures 
introduced, including renovating school facilities. 
A frequent image of the campaigning by FijiFirst’s 
leading figures was attendance at school functions 
of various kinds, including graduation ceremonies 
and building projects (Fraenkel 2015a). Even 
during the campaign and in the two-day ‘blackout’ 
on election advertising immediately prior to 
the poll, government billboards associating the 
interim prime minister with such nation-building 
programs remained on display.
Since the election, the public attention to 
education and schooling at all levels and of various 
forms by government ministers has continued. 
Education availability and standards in Fiji and 
other South Pacific countries — including the 
most populous country, Papua New Guinea — 
are often insufficient to train the skilled labour 
forces required to increase economic growth 
(MacWilliam 2014b). Prime Minister Bainimarama 
made much of the right to an education in a 
post-election address to the UN Human Rights 
Council. He also linked development of a ‘network 
of Government Telecentres across Fiji’ to improve 
internet access throughout the country with 
this right of Fijian children. Subsequently, when 
addressing the Council of The University of the 
South Pacific (USP), he repeated the government’s 
stress on formal education.
During the campaign, FijiFirst and other 
parties gave most attention to primary and 
secondary education. However, prior to the 
election, concerns had also been expressed about 
the availability of tertiary education, university 
and technical. For some years, USP and the 
Fiji National University had specifically aimed 
at increasing the proportion of the population 
of South Pacific countries that attends tertiary 
education institutions. As the vice chancellor 
of USP, Rajesh Chandra, emphasised in that 
university’s Strategic Plan 2010–2012, the region 
is notable for the very small numbers of the 
population who undertake university education 
(MacWilliam 2014b:125). An expressed goal was to 
match international rates for this level of training. 
As well as encouraging the direction at both major 
universities, one of the first acts of the newly elected 
Bainimarama Government was to provide funds for 
Fiji’s third university, the Lautoka-based University 
of Fiji, to extend its presence in Samabula, Suva. 
Given that the University of Fiji offers courses 
which are similar to, if not the same as those 
already offered at USP and Fiji National University, 
the support for the University of Fiji is a further 
extension of the drive to increase attendance at 
tertiary institutions as well as a means of increasing 
the competition between the three universities.
Since the election, there has also been a renewed 
attention to technical education.8 When opening 
the new Technical College of Fiji-Vanua Levu Arya 
Samaj campus at Naduna in Labasa, the prime 
minister emphasised that the country needed:
... more of every trade discipline as the 
economy improves and the opportunities 
in the North expand. This is a vital capacity 
building exercise in the North as well as an 
unprecedented opportunity for our young 
people to achieve viable and worthwhile lives. 
(Vula 8/4/2015)
At the opening of the college, an extension 
of an existing network, the prime minister also 
announced that further technical institutions would 
be opened as part of this national chain in Bua, 
Nawaca and Wainikoro.
There are other indicators of the importance 
the government has placed upon extending and 
improving formal education opportunities and 
standards in Fiji. The fighting which has broken 
out between the new minister for education, 
former USP and Fiji National University academic 
Dr Mahendra Reddy, and the department’s 
senior official (Swami 5/1/2015) suggests the 
determination of the government to take control of 
the administrative process in the central department 
responsible for any changes.
Conclusion
It has been argued here, as was done previously 
when examining Fiji’s political economy 
(MacWilliam 2014a), that there is much to be 
gained by using international referents and 
experience for understanding contemporary 
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conditions. Whether these referents come from 
outside the South Pacific region or even another 
century at the beginning of industrialisation should 
not prevent employing their relevance. While using 
the idea of populism to describe FijiFirst’s election 
campaign policies also satisfies the objective 
of internationalising and extending in time the 
terms of change in the country, it has been shown 
here that what is popular is not the same as what 
is populist.
While there are certainly occasions when blocs 
representing distinct commercial interests and 
directions contest elections and aim to win popular 
support among the voters, this is not what has 
occurred either prior to or since the 2014 election 
in Fiji. The military regime effectively ended not 
simply key institutions that were critical means for 
tying political power to economic power, including 
parties, trade unions, the GCC, parliament and 
other state agencies. The regime that came to 
power and extended its hold through an electoral 
victory also broke the previous connection 
between economic and political power. The 
Bainimarama Government has been in the process 
of constructing forms of mediation that are distinct 
from the previous direct ties between owning and 
operating major commercial enterprises as well as 
holding political office. To put it crudely, whatever 
may happen in the future, the Bainimarama 
Government is now dissimilar to that of Rabuka 
or Qarase, even if each is headed by a Taukei and 
dependent upon military support.
Instead, the designated policy proposals that 
were labelled populist, as well as the government’s 
subsequent actions, have been means of garnering 
popular support from the bulk of the voting 
population. Since 2006, but especially since the 
election campaign, this support provides the means 
for organising the representation of labour within 
a capitalist political economy. This representation, 
given the stamp of approval by an overwhelming 
electoral victory, is one side of the same coin. 
The other side, for which the government is also 
well placed, is to represent capital, industrial and 
commercial, urban and rural. Being neither of 
labour nor important capitalists makes it possible to 
mediate on behalf of capitalism.
While the current FijiFirst Bainimarama-led 
government has important similarities with that 
which ruled in mid-nineteenth-century France, that 
country’s history also provides possible clues for 
anticipating the government’s future. In attempting 
to mediate on behalf of all classes and strata, 
Bonaparte’s rule became increasingly repressive. 
As much as the Bainimarama Government can, for 
now, represent most classes and strata within Fiji, 
mediating while retaining popularity, advancing 
economic growth and profitability, it is limited in 
its capacity to deal with the international currents 
that affect conditions for accumulation in a small 
country. Having diminished opposition to its rule 
in Fiji, the success or otherwise of dealing with 
major international changes could determine to an 
important extent what happens domestically.
It will be a hard act to satisfy the most 
important business people while maintaining 
popular support by improving living conditions for 
many who are now impoverished. Expect the extent 
to which continued reliance upon military support 
is important to be regularly revealed.
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Endnotes
1 This Discussion Paper is an extended and revised 
version of a seminar presentation made in the SSGM 
series on 23/3/2015. I am indebted to comments 
made by attendees at the seminar, and in particular 
to Anthony Regan, whose persistence encouraged 
the further development of the argument. John Cox 
urged that the paper be turned into the present form, 
and I am grateful for his support. The advice given by 
anonymous referees has been welcome.
2 For the most recent iterations of these themes, see the 
essays by Brij Lal, Stewart Firth, Robert Norton, and 
Jon Fraenkel in The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs (2015). Special Issue: 
Fiji: Elections and the Future 104(2).
3 Including recently in a speech by the prime minister 
at the High Level Segment of the 28th Session of the 
UN Human Rights Council, in Geneva on 2/3/2015.
4 I have no statistically reliable data on the amounts 
of money used by FijiFirst for its campaign, nor to 
what extent the party outspent its rivals. Attempts 
to collect this information have been unsuccessful. 
However, I was present in Fiji for some weeks during 
2014, including in the week prior to the September 
election, and have no reason to doubt the accuracy 
of this conclusion. Nor has anything appeared 
subsequent to the election that would refute the claim 
made here.
5 For earlier work on tourism, see MacWilliam with 
Daveta (2003).
6 For a report on the establishment of the country’s 
first Microsoft Information Technology Academy, see 
Prasad (5/3/2015).
7 A recent example of this form of representation 
has been the February 2015 announcement by the 
minister for employment, productivity and industrial 
relations of a wage increase to Fiji $2.32 per hour 
for approximately 100,000 workers ‘in the informal 
sector, as well as those workers in the formal sector 
that are not covered under the current 10 Wages 
Regulations’. Subsequently, the minister reminded 
employers and workers on 30/6/2015 that the rise 
took effect from 1 July.
8 On the upgrading and rebranding of the Fiji National 
University’s School of Maritime Studies to the 
Fiji Maritime Academy, with assistance from the 
Colombo International Nautical and Engineering 
College, see Bolatiki (10/3/2015).
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